``What We're Fighting For" - A Follow-Up
Saleh Bashir, Hassan Mneimneh, Hazem Saghie
al-Hayat, April 30, 2002

The fact that American intellectuals have addressed the world on behalf of their country, through an open letter with 60 signatories, is an extremely important development in the aftermath of the events of the 11th of September. These events have ushered the beginning of a new phase in international intercourse and global history, and in the position of the United States in both. This is indeed the case whether one accepts the view that the terrorist acts were the originating cause of the new phase, as argued by many, or a mere pretext to establish a global hegemony, as argued by others.

This Letter has a twofold importance: (1) It restores, irrespective of any assessment of its contents, the validity of an intellectual dialogue that transcends local identities, countries, and cultural spheres, in its discussion of universal human values-or at least, of values which are viewed as such-as is consistent with the role of the intellectuals; and (2) by resorting to the intellectual realm, it moves the American voice to a domain where a hegemony based on force is not possible. It may have been possible for the United States to impose its will on the world, single-handedly and categorically, at the military, strategic, diplomatic, and economic levels, that is at levels where power is material and/or quantitative (a course of action often undertaken in the past decade). Such imposition remains impossible in the intellectual realm. Indeed, in the intellectual realm, where propositions are subjected to reasoned criticism, contributions from the United States are on an equal footing with contributions from all other sources.

We consider it unwarranted to accuse the signatories of the Letter of complicity with any American policy and of attempting to establish a global intellectual hegemony, as do proponents of conspiracy theories, unfortunately in wide currency in the Arab world. It should be noted, however, that the weak intensity of the self-critical sections of the Letter point to a problematic approach with regard to the rest of the world community, which is best understood as a byproduct of a naïveté that generates a paternalistic attitude. Implicit in the Letter is the supposition that presenting the collective (American) cultural self is sufficient to generate the acceptance of the others; this collective self is thus assumed to have an irresistible charm, and that it is ultimately superior to other collective cultural selves.

This criticism does not affect our recognition of the utmost importance of the American contribution to culture and beyond, or of the tangible benefits derived from this contribution by our societies as well as others. Nor is meant as a qualification of our denunciation of all forms of anti-Americanism, from mild xenophobic rationalizations to blunt racist formulations, recognizing that anti-Americanism in our societies is assimilated into various ideological formulations, nationalistic and religious, leftist and rightist.

It is our assessment that the accord between the positions of the United States government and those espoused by the Letter is significant, far beyond any accusations of complicity or conspiracy, as indicative of the quasi-consensus that has coalesced within the United States with regard to the war on terrorism. Indeed, had the Letter been product of the American administration or one of its agencies, as insinuated or assumed in many Arab responses, it would have been easily dismissible. As an intellectual contribution, this Letter is owed a reaction beyond the instinctive denunciation to which some of these responses have resorted.

The American intellectuals who have detailed their vision of the "War on Terrorism" in this Letter, addressing it to the world, have implicitly accepted to subject their views to questioning and critique. Such critique should adhere to all due seriousness, by focusing on the text, its content, structure, and methodology, and should not fall back on the usual complaints against American policy, limit itself to a mere inventory of the omissions in the text (an obvious criticism that can be applied to any text), or engage in accusations against some or all of the signatories. These approaches, even if substantive, are not central to a focused critique. Instead, by developing marginal issues, they merely result in absolving the text of the criticism that it deserves.

A cursory reading of the Letter yields a preliminary conclusion, one which is indeed confirmed by further scrutiny, that it is an ideological document. It may even be the most gravely significant ideological formulation to originate from American society since the end of the Cold War. Through considerable intellectual formalism, this Letter lays the foundations for a legitimization of a global role and hegemony for the sole superpower at this moment in history. It follows what can be described as a classical approach: premises believed to be self-evident, in the form of universal principles, are stated at the beginning of the Letter, then used as a framework for the interpretation of an event that despite its gravity (or maybe because of it) remains unique and exceptional-the attacks of the 11th of September. This interpretation is used to advance a proposition, presented in ethical terms and transcending politics and history: the notion of the "just war" as a burden and a mission to be assumed by the United States, not on the basis of considerations and/or justifications stemming from it being the sole power able to assume such role on behalf and under the supervision
of the world community, but in the name of what the Letter refers to as "American values", understood as being synonymous with "universal values".

The Letter thus bases its argument on a specific American right-the right of retaliation as a result of the aggression of the 11th of September. It should be noted that, outside of limited radical circles, a quasi-consensus exists in recognizing this American right. Objections to this right, when they arise, address its application (notably in terms of its effects on Afghan civilians), and not its principle. We do, however, fear that this right, through the proposed formulation, is transformed into an absolute one, with a moral foundation, on the basis of a theoretical construct centered on the notion of the "just war". It is our contention that this construct, which is advocated forcefully in the Letter, stems from a basic fallacy that is a product not of an attempt at deception, but from a parochialism in dealing with world affairs, displayed notably through considering the September 11 aggression an event of absolute uniqueness unequaled by any other in our world.

There are indeed unique aspects for this act of aggression, from the issuing of an edict (a fatwa) calling on the killing of any and all Americans, to the commission of the act in a location far from where the perpetrators originate, and the absence of a traditional theater of war. This act of aggression does indeed put into application the notion of collective responsibility of all Americans towards the policy of the United States. However, stressing the uniqueness of the crime runs the
risk of absolving its victim from any accountability in seeking retribution, a risk that seems materialized when the current actions of the U.S. administration are considered. It is therefore imperative to deconstruct the arguments used in advocating this construct, irrespective of the intentions of those advocating it.

The Letter starts by enunciating five principles, by "affirm[ing] five fundamental truths that pertain to all people without exception". These "truths" can be agreed upon without difficulty, if not by consensus, by a wide effective majority. There can be no hesitation in accepting the validity of the principles that state "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights", and that "the basic subject of society is the human person, and the legitimate role of government is to protect and help to foster the conditions for human flourishing", and that "killing in the name of God is contrary to faith in God and is the greatest betrayal of the universality of religious faith". Some stated "truths" can even be interpreted and accepted by adherents to non-democratic thought.

The universal character of these principles is therefore not contested. In addition, the fact that American democracy derives its foundations from these principles and is indeed one of the most mature and developed systems of government in modern history is not a subject of serious dispute. The problematic aspect of the Letter is in its extension of the claim of a universal character beyond these basic principles and its application to the so-called "American values" and the American experience. In effect, while the American experience does offer a successful manifestation of democratic practice, it remains one such manifestation among many. It is part of a global phenomenon, not its totality, nor necessarily its best example. Assertions to the contrary are often beyond the realm of political thought and its methodologies, but rather belong to ideological beliefs steeped in parochialism and reductionism, and as such run the risk of contradicting the democratic framework itself, which recognizes the relativity of assessments and comparisons.

Indeed, while American democracy may be assessed as superior to many of its European counterparts in some respects, it is met or exceeded by the latter in other respects. European democracies are more concerned with the humane content of the democratic principle. This is evident in their positions towards capital punishment, their focus on human rights as a major component of their diplomatic policy and international relations, and their objections and dismay towards the treatment of the al-Qa'idah and Taliban prisoners in Guantanamo, Cuba. American democratic practice, on the other hand, appears more dogmatic and prone to revenge in many instances, and accepts violence as a tool and a component.

With regard to Arab and other Third-World societies, the American experience is unlikely to be emulated as the sole model for modernization and modernity. A more reasoned approach would strive to assimilate the sum total of the modernity effort-a global endeavor characterized by the participation of all human societies and that has witnessed its culmination in the Western European context. The acquisition of modernity in a particular society, if it were to happen, can only be through its local appropriation by the individual society, which thus imbues it with its particular character. Otherwise, even in the best-case scenario, the global community is impoverished and loses in diversity.

The American experience itself is based on this process of appropriation. It is true that the United States, as a nation and as a system of government, is the only state to be created, willingly and explicitly, with a foundation of the aforementioned universal principles. Since the American independence from Britain, these principles have guided the integration of new immigrants as citizens. This is indeed an exceptional occurrence. Its exceptional character is, however, due to unique historical circumstances. Its duplication is therefore virtually impossible. It cannot be considered a model for emulation without qualification.

The United States is one of only a handful of countries founded by an act of will, with a document stating its founding principles. What is applicable to the United States is not applicable to political entities with a deep historical dimension, as is the dominant form globally. Seeking democratic forms, for the latter, has to account for the accumulated legacies that have shaped their mindset and social structures. More effort is thus needed, and progress cannot be expected to proceed linearly, as the European historical evidence of the past two centuries proves.

Even the role of religion in the "American way of life", which is almost completely different from the various secular experiences in other countries, in their different forms, does in effect derive from the same uniqueness of the historical circumstances, and therefore cannot be viewed as an ultimate model.

The Letter suggests that the United States has reached an optimal solution for the compatibility between religion and democracy, whereby religion has a recognized role within a democratic context, and is not oppressed or excluded from the public sphere. Instead, it is provided with the opportunity to express itself and prosper. This may indeed be true, recognizing that American society displays two characteristics that do not co-exist in any other Western society: a thorough integration of democratic principles, and a deep religiosity. This may be a result of the dominant Protestant faith, which favors the multiplication of denominations, and which has not experienced in its history the experience of a religion-state (along the lines of the nation-state), as witnessed by Catholicism and Islam, for example. It was therefore able to accommodate a high level of co-existence between denominations, elevating it to a guiding principle in public life, without risking the accession of any denomination to a level of hegemony over government. Protestantism, as the dominant faith of the founding era, thus left its imprint on the system of government as well as society in the United States, and allowed the accommodation of other religions along the patterns accorded for denominations. American religions have indeed evolved to acquire many of the characteristics of denominations. The reproduction of this specifically American history and experience in different locales and spaces cannot be assured. More so since neither the American experience nor American Protestantism witnessed what Europe underwent in the 17th and 18th centuries, i.e. the scientific revolution and the *Enlightenment, experiences which are needed urgently in Third World societies. The American exposure to each of the scientific revolution and the *Enlightenment produced local forms that remained isolated from the rest of the world.

We also note that there is no simple outcome for the comparison between a democratic formulation that excludes religious expression from the public political space and one that makes room for adjacent religious absolutisms-in the context of a political and societal quorum that is supposed to be based on the relativity of truth. While we do not intend to address the issue in this reply, we underline the wealth and multiplicity of the available models.

We have discussed the extension of a universal character to "American values" at relative length because of the importance assigned to it in the Letter, notably as a theoretical background to the proposition of the "Just War". Both intellectually and ethically, we have to express our reservations with regard to this proposition, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to accept the universal character of "American values". We further think that the introduction of this notion into the current international scene, with its lack of agreed upon neutral reference is outright dangerous.

It is our view that the two notions "justice" and "war" are mutually exclusive. This view stems from a philosophical position that argues for the incompatibility between violence and a number of values, notably those associated with life and humanity. It is thus not possible to combine "justice" and "war", or "justice" and "capital punishment". War is evil, and as such cannot be described as just, nor can any other positive ethical qualification be applied to it: Common sense forbids the combination of evil and justice or ethics. This is particularly true in the case of the modern version of war, where the distinction between combatants and civilians is lost. It can be noted that since WWI, most of the victims of conflicts have been civilians (the most blatant example being the conflict inflicted upon Iraq for a decade, where the regime has not been affected at all).

This position does not imply an adherence to naïve pacifism. We accept the proposition that war might be a necessary choice-to fight back aggression, to protect civilians, or for other legitimate reasons. We do however disagree with the notion that such reasons create the conditions for a "just war". War, as the ultimate violence, may grant power holders the opportunity to bypass legal constraints and moral inhibitors, and as such cannot be described as ethical in an unqualified categorical way, but only in relative terms. War, at best and whatever its justifications, can be viewed as belonging to the category of "the most detestable of the permissible" that Islamic jurisprudence applies to divorce. The notion of a "just war" that endows war with ethical value is in our judgment in conflict with ethics, even in instances involving the defense of the innocent.

The danger of the notion of "just war", particularly when embraced by a power that holds a monopoly of hegemony and has the means to impose its will on the world, as is the case of the United States, risks being used as rationalization or pretext, bypassing various considerations, legal and otherwise. It furthermore transports conflicts from the context of a reality that implicitly accepts differing views, into an absolute self-legitimizing ideological framework. We fear that the treatment afforded by the American authorities to their captives in Guantanamo, Cuba is but a first example of the application of the notion of "just war" with its dehumanizing effects on the enemy. Another example is the categorization of the global community and its constituent states into "good" and "evil" camps, outside of any meaningful objective criteria. The effective result is that the party labeled "evil" is thus able to score an ideological victory against its "good" opponent, even if defeated militarily, by succeeding in dragging it to the evil exchange of warfare.

Stressing the necessary character of the war negates the fact that war is a free choice, whether against "evil" or otherwise. War is thus deprived of any potential glorification and ensuing chauvinism that might develop in the camp of those engaged in it. Furthermore, it accomplishes two goals: (1) it constrains it within the limits of established laws, and (2) it preserves its defensive character at its forefront, even if offensive action is undertaken in accordance with military or strategic considerations. This second goal helps constrain the war geographically, so that it does transform itself into a self-propelling mechanism, leading to a continuous series of battles to which succumbs one country after another (such as the Punic wars in antiquity, and the Napoleonic wars in the more recent history).

As opposed to positing it as an imperial moment, when war is understood as born out of necessity, it is subject to critique, revision, and re-definition-functions assumed nowadays by the free press, and in the ability to monitor the conditions and treatment of captives. Major differences exist between "just war" and "war of just necessity" both in terms of the centrality of violence and the effects on human victims, as a function of readiness for compromise and political engagement in general. Even in the most acute case of a war of just necessity, the conflict with fascism in WWII, it has been argued that it may have been possible, had the war been framed in terms of necessity more than justice, to spare the lives of millions of Jews. It would have been certainly possible to spare hundreds of thousands of Berlin men and women the misery and rape to which they were subjected, and it would have been possible to avoid the destruction of Dresden. The atomic bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stems indeed from a presentation of the conflict as a just war, which elevated it to a level of autonomy, with successive countries succumbing to the unfolding of an imperial history.

There is no doubt that the effects of the Arab-Jewish war of 1948 would have been lessened, in both material and psychological impacts, had the focus on Jewish independence been shifted towards a stress on the necessity generated by the Nazi Holocaust and the resistance of the west to Jewish immigration.

It may be argued that such an approach is anathema to the thinking of the military and the propagandists who would assess it as defeatist. Our concern here is the role of the intellectuals who should be summoned to use all their skeptical and critical tools to resist the demons that may inhabit militarism and are summoned upon the breakout of war through the temptation of violence.

Accordingly, even the affliction of terrorism does not warrant to be countered within the framework of a "just war" as suggested in the Letter, or to be dealt with outside the confines of recognized laws. Terrorism is an act of genocide, if not by the number of its victims, then by its logic and motives, since it selects its targets not as a result of political enmity or military considerations, but as a random sample that represents the ethnic, cultural, or social collective. The perpetrators of terrorism can therefore be subject to the same legal process that has prosecuted war criminals, from the Nuremberg trials to the Brussels and The Hague trials that handled war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the Balkans and in Rwanda. The legal precedents may be applied to terrorism, avoiding the temptation to resort to extra-legal methods on the basis of the precarious notion of a "just war" that is prone for excesses.

These observations are presented for the sake of a dialogue that we consider of vital importance, with the sole aim of enhancing the critical and auto-critical approaches that are needed in our Arabic culture and life, noting that we, the signatories, do not claim any representative quality.

We do have to note the depth of the lacunae that afflict our culture in this respect, which were further exposed in the aftermath of the 11th of September, as displayed by the evident strength of a populism that was nurtured during the Cold War and of the mythological nostalgia of a bygone era, neither of which were overcome by the advent of modernity.

Addressing these issues is evidently the mission of Arab society, and Arab intellectuals in particular. It should be however noted that some American policies (which were alluded to) constitute a complicating factor. The Letter could have addressed the defects of these policies, by giving more attention to the notion of justice, especially when applied to the Palestinian people, which has suffered injustice, and still does. This injustice, and the pervasive indifference towards it are at the core of the disarray that afflicts the Middle East.

This criticism, however, should not diffuse the need for Arab efforts to engage the American other in dialogue, nor should it be construed to absolve Arab society of its primary responsibility for the lacunae that afflict it.

Originally published in al-Hayat, April 30, 2002. Translated from the Arabic by Hassan Mneimneh

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